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Abstract
We analyse the e®ect of uncertainty concerning the state and the nature of asset
price movements on the optimal monetary policy response. Uncertainty is modelled
by adding Markov-switching shocks to a DSGE model with capital accumulation. In
our analysis we consider both Taylor-type rules and optimal policy. Taylor rules have
been shown to provide a good description of US monetary policy. Deviations from
its implied interest rates have been associated with risks of ¯nancial disruptions.
Whereas interest rates in Taylor-type rules respond to a small subset of information,
optimal policy considers all state variables and shocks. Our results suggest that,
when a bubble bursts, the Taylor rule fails to achieve a soft landing, contrary to the
optimal policy.
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11 Introduction
Several authors have identi¯ed a break in output growth volatility, in the
US, around the mid-1980s | see, for example, (Kim and Nelson 1999) and
(McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). According to (Stock and Watson 2002)
the standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP was one-third less during
1984 to 2002 than it was during 1960 to 1983. The decline in the volatility
of in°ation and real GDP, in the last two decades, in the US and in other
industrialised countries, has been dubbed the Great Moderation or the Long
Boom. According to (Taylor 2007), this may have been the most important
macroeconomic event in the last half century. Lower volatility of output in
the post-1984 period is associated with less frequent and less severe recessions:
since 1984, the National Bureau of Economic Research identi¯ed only two
recessions | one in 1990 and the other in 2001 | which were among the
mildest and shortest recessions since the Second World War, with duration
from peak to trough of eight months each.
These changes in the business cycle have raised the question of what has
been the role of the Federal Reserve in this new regime of the US economy.
Although structural changes in the economy and good luck concerning the
shocks that hit the economy during that period had certainly a role | see, for
example, (Stock and Watson 2002) and (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000)
|, it has been argued that improvements in monetary policy were crucial in
generating a lower in°ation and a more stable output | see, for example,
(Bernanke 2004) and (Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler 2000). Among the changes
in monetary policymaking is the apparent adoption of the so-called Taylor
principle, which implies a response of the interest rate policy instrument to
changes in in°ation with a coe±cient greater than one. In fact, a more aggressive
reaction of the interest rate to in°ation and to the output gap is an important
di®erence between the period of the Great Moderation and the previous period
2| see, for example, (Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler 2000).
An extensive literature on monetary-policy rules suggests that to follow a
speci¯c simple rule may be the best prescription to a good monetary policy |
see, for example, (Taylor 1999). The Taylor rule was proposed as a guideline for
assessing interest rate decisions (Taylor 1993). Additionally, ¯nancial market
analysts, scholars and central banks' sta® have been using monetary policy
rules increasingly to forecast interest rates and to evaluate and describe central
bank policy actions | see, for example, (Judd and Trehan 1995) and (Blinder
and Reis 2006). The Taylor rule has provided a good description of monetary
policy under Alan Greenspan's mandate | see (Rudebusch 2006) and Figure
1. However, Taylor rule's in°ation and unemployment coe±cients are better
seen as \historically average responses"1 rather than as a literal description
of the actual monetary policy of the Federal Reserve (Blinder and Reis 2006).
Actually, the Federal Reserve has deviated from interest rate movements implied
by the Taylor rule on several occasions. Those deviations of the US monetary
policy have been associated with high risks of ¯nancial markets disruptions
(Greenspan 2004). The stock market collapse in 1987 and the 1998 Russian
debt default, followed by the demise of the Long-Term Capital Management
hedge fund were two such episodes of monetary policy easing relative to the
Taylor rule prescription. The terrorist attack of September 11 was another
instance involving a high risk of ¯nancial instability and an aggressive monetary
easing. More recently, following the sub-prime crisis, the Federal Reserve has
cut the Feds Fund rate in 300 basis points, between August 2007 and March
2008.
(Taylor 2007), although recognising that the Taylor rule is not supposed
to be followed mechanically, argues that monetary policy might deliver better
results, in terms of low in°ation and output variability, by staying closer to the
1This was the expression used by (Greenspan 2004).
3rule. (Taylor 2007) sees more disadvantages than advantages in deviations
of interest rates from the movements implied by the Taylor rule. On the
other hand, (Greenspan 2004) argues that in events of the type described
above simple policy rules would be inadequate as they are unable to take into
consideration every contingency. In the same vein, (Svensson 2003) argues that
a commitment to a simple instrument rule may be far from optimal in some
circumstances. In fact, (Greenspan 2004) advocates instead a risk-management
approach, which \emphasises understanding as much as possible the many
sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face" (Greenspan 2004, p.
37). (Svensson and Williams 2005) develop a procedure to solve optimal
monetary policy problems under model uncertainty which, in their words,
is consistent with Greenspan's risk-management approach. (Svensson and
Williams 2005) approach to optimal policy under model uncertainty considers
the whole probability distribution of future variables.
In this paper, we apply (Svensson and Williams 2005) solution methods to
a DSGE model with investment and uncertainty concerning the nature of asset
price movements. In (Dupor 2005) model, agents cannot distinguish between
fundamental and non-fundamental shocks in asset prices. In this paper, we
add an additional source of uncertainty to Dupor's setting. The additional
uncertainty a®ects the behaviour of asset prices via a Markov-switching autoregressive
coe±cient in both fundamental and non-fundamental shocks. The assumption
of Markov-switching non-fundamental shocks adds realism to the model, judging
by the empirical evidence reported in, among others, (Cecchetti, Lam, and
Mark 1990), (Bonomo and Garcia 1994) and (Dri±ll and Sola 1998).
We use this setting, where fads and bubbles in asset prices are modelled
as non-linear processes, to compare the performance of Taylor-type rules with
the optimal policy in stabilising the economy. In the Taylor-type rules that
we consider in this paper, the interest rate reacts with ¯xed coe±cients to a
4small subset of information available to the central bank, namely, in°ation, the
output gap and, possibly, asset prices. On the other hand, optimal rules take
into account all state variables, shocks and the uncertainty in the economy,
namely, in our economy it takes into account the switching nature of asset
prices and therefore the probability of a crash. To obtain the results reported
below, we employed the methods proposed by (Svensson and Williams 2005),
assuming full information under commitment.2
We focus our analysis on output and real interest rate adjustment when the
asset price bubble bursts, namely, we compare the performance of Taylor-type
rules and optimal policy during and after a bubble episode. Simulations
seem to suggest that the optimal policy is more e®ective in containing the
bubble-induced expansion, producing a soft landing. Additionally, our results
suggest that real interest rates are less volatile under Taylor-type rules.
Our exposition is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
discusses the monetary policy framework. Section 3 evaluates the performance
of the economy under Taylor-type rules and optimal policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model with Markov-switching asset prices
In a world where asset price movements simply re°ect fundamentals, their only
role in monetary policy making is as a conveyer of information about the state
of the economy. However, there is evidence that asset prices are partly driven by
non-fundamental movements, that is, there are fads or bubbles | e.g., (Shiller
2000). In these periods, asset prices may induce ine±cient decisions by ¯rms
and consumers, and therefore destabilise the economy. This has been the main
argument for monetary policy to respond directly to asset prices | see, for
2(Alexandre, Ba» c~ ao, and Dri±ll 2007) use those methods in the context of an
open-economy model.
5example, (Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani 2000) and (Dupor 2005).
However, there is disagreement on whether policymakers should target asset
prices because of the uncertainty concerning the nature of the forces driving
asset prices. Some authors argue that uncertainty concerning the magnitude
of misalignments in asset prices is not trivial and that it might imply that the
welfare bene¯ts from including them in the policy reaction function may vanish
very easily | see, among others, (Gilchrist and Saito 2006), (Alexandre and
Ba» c~ ao 2005) and (Tetlow 2004).
In this paper, we use (Dupor 2005)'s DSGE model with capital accumulation
and adjustment costs to evaluate the performance monetary policy rules in
stabilising the economy. This model, described in the next section, was developed
to study the optimal response of monetary policy to asset prices when agents
cannot discern the nature of the shocks that move asset prices. In Dupor's
model, expectations of future returns to investment may be a®ected by unwarranted
views about future productivity, resulting in \irrational exuberance" and overinvestment.
In this paper, we add an additional source of uncertainty to Dupor's setting.
The additional uncertainty a®ects the behaviour of asset prices via a Markov-switching
autoregressive coe±cient in both fundamental and non-fundamental shocks.
We therefore assume a Markov-switching process, with booming periods of
continuous growth in asset prices being interrupted by sudden corrections,
aiming to capture the complex behaviour of ¯nancial markets.
This setting allows us to compare the performance of Taylor-type rules with
the optimal policy, when ¯rms and policymakers face uncertainty concerning
the driving forces of asset prices and the moment when bubbles in asset prices
will collapse.
In the next sections we provide a more detailed analysis of the model and
of the monetary policy framework we use in our analysis.
62.1 Uncertainty in a model with investment
In this paper, we use (Dupor 2005)'s DSGE model with capital accumulation
to evaluate the performance of monetary policy rules when a bubble bursts. In
Dupor's model, expectations of future returns to investment may be a®ected by
unwarranted views about future productivity, resulting in \irrational exuberance"
and overinvestment. Below we brie°y sketch the model, referring the reader to
(Dupor 2005) for further details.
The model's \household-¯rms" are simultaneously consumers (utility maximizers
subject to a budget constraint) and producers (under monopolistic competition).
They sell labour, and hire the labour used in production, in a competitive
labour market, while the capital stock is rented from \investment-¯rms".
Investment-¯rms are responsible for capital accumulation decisions. Dupor
assumes there are costs of adjusting capital, represented by a function ©. The
investment-¯rms' period pro¯t is given by receipts from renting capital (rtkt),
minus investment expenditure (kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt, where ± is the depreciation
rate), minus capital adjustment costs:











where ¯t+j is the discount factor and ~ zt+j is the process investment-¯rms expect
pro¯ts to follow in the future. The following assumption is used:






The factor µt+j is the crucial element: it represents non-fundamental shocks
(when µt+j 6= 1) that distort investment decisions. Dupor uses a (log-)linear
7speci¯cation for the non-fundamental shock, chosen to produce a hump-shaped
e®ect:
^ µt = !^ µ1;t + (! ¡ 1)^ µ2;t (4)
^ µj;t = ½j^ µj;t¡1 + ^ "
µ
t (j = 1;2) (5)
where ^ "µ
t is white noise.
Instead we use a Markov-switching speci¯cation, to replicate the impact of
a sudden burst in asset prices, characteristic of ¯nancial crises. We assume
there are two states. The two states aim at capturing the complex behaviour
of ¯nancial markets, which have quiescent periods, when they seem to be
driven by fundamentals, interspersed with periods of \irrational exuberance".
Therefore, we assume that in the ¯rst state the shocks have no persistence:
^ µj;t = ^ "
µ
t (j = 1;2) (6)
In the second, exuberant regime, shocks are mildly explosive. This is
achieved by multiplying Dupor's autoregressive coe±cients by 1.6, which yields
autoregressive coe±cients close to 1.09:
^ µj;t = 1:6½j^ µj;t¡1 + ^ "
µ
t (j = 1;2) (7)
When the economy moves from state 1 to state 2, investment-¯rms expect
pro¯ts to increase exponentially and a bubble develops. The bubble bursts
when the economy moves from state 2 back to state 1. The state of the economy











where pij = 1 ¡ pii (when i 6= j) and pij is the probability of moving from
state i in the current period to state j in the next period. In this model,
the policymaker is uncertain about the state of the economy in the next
8period. However, the transition probabilities are known and exogenous. In
our computations we used the values 0:25, 0:50 and 0:75 for pii, though here
we only report results obtained with p11 = p22 = 0:5, which were found to be
representative. The other parameters in the model take the same values as in
(Dupor 2005, Table 1, page 738).
We focus our analysis on the comparison of the behaviour of the optimal
policy and of the Taylor rule. In the case of the Taylor rule, the interest
rate reacts to output and in°ation with coe±cients of 0.5 and 1.5, respectively
(Taylor 1993).
The solution of the model is obtained using the method proposed by (Svensson
and Williams 2005) for solving Markov-switching rational expectations models.
Appropriately for our purposes, these authors argue that their approach to
model uncertainty is consistent with Greenspan's risk-management approach,
mentioned in the Introduction.
2.2 Taylor-type rules
Simple, or Taylor-type, rules have been widely discussed among academics in
monetary policy analysis. Several arguments have been used in its defense. On
one hand, it has been argued that simple rules perform nearly as well as optimal
rules (see, for example, (Rudebusch and Svensson 1999)). On the other hand, it
has been argued that simple rules are very robust to several types of uncertainty
(see, for example, (Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999)). We therefore consider
a set of simple rules to see how they compare to the optimal policy rule and
how good they are in dealing with uncertainty concerning movements in asset
prices. The set of rules used in our computations are summarised in Table 2.
We consider the original Taylor rule (Taylor 1993), where the interest rate
reacts to output and in°ation with coe±cients of 0.5 and 1.5, respectively. As
9mentioned in the Introduction, this rule has been shown to provide a good
description of the US monetary policy since 1987. Following the now extensive
literature on asset prices and monetary policy (see, for example, (Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani 2000)), we also look at the results for a Taylor
rule that includes a reaction to asset prices (TR+q). The coe±cient on asset
prices is 0.1, as in (Bernanke and Gertler 1999).
Several authors have concluded that monetary policy responds to the expected
value of in°ation rather than to current or past in°ation (see, for example,
(Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler 2000)). (Levin, Wieland, and Williams 2003)
provide a discussion of the rationale and robustness of in°ation-forecast based
rules. We consider a simple in°ation-forecast based policy rule (IFB) where
the interest rate responds to deviations of expected in°ation from the target.
We also experiment an in°ation-forecast based rule with an expected output
term (IFB+y) and with an expected output term and an asset price term
(IFB+y+q). The coe±cients in the in°ation-forecast based policy rules are as
in the Taylor rule, that is, 1.5 coe±cient in the expected in°ation and 0.5 in the
expected output. The coe±cient on asset prices is 0.1, again as in (Bernanke
and Gertler 1999). We also tried a stronger reaction to expected in°ation,
with coe±cient 2.0 in the case of rule IFB+y+q aggressive. The coe±cients on
Et¼t+1 and Etyt+1 for forecast-based rules were chosen so as to be close to 1.5,
among values for which the algorithm of (Svensson and Williams 2005) could
¯nd a solution to the model.
3 Soft landing in a Markov-switching economy
In this paper we investigate the limits of simple Taylor-type rules at moderating
the disruptive e®ects of asset market disturbances and whether central banks
may have incentives to deviate from the prescriptions of Taylor-type rules. We
10do that using the optimal policy, described above, as a benchmark. We only
present the results for p11 = 0:5 and p22 = 0:5, as we did not ¯nd signi¯cant
di®erences in our computations for the other combinations of transition probabilities.
We start by computing the unconditional standard deviations of the variables
of the model, for the optimal policy and for Taylor-type rules. The results
are presented in Table 3. Except for the simple in°ation-forecast based rule
(IFB), output and its components (consumption and investment) are much
more stable under Taylor-type rules than under the optimal policy. From the
results in Table 3, we would conclude that the Taylor rule is signi¯cantly more
e®ective at stabilising output, but not employment. In fact, output is much
more stable (around ten times) under a Taylor rule than under the optimal
policy. The performance of the simple in°ation-forecast based rule, which, in
general, delivers the worst results in terms of volatility, improves signi¯cantly
when the interest rate reacts to expected output and to asset prices. These
results may be related with the ¯ndings of (Levin, Wieland, and Williams 2003)
that including an output gap term makes in°ation-forecast based rules more
robust. The real interest rate is always much more stable when policymakers
follow Taylor-type rules than when they follow the optimal policy, which may
be a sign that the Taylor rules are not aggressive enough.
To analyse the adjustment process of output following the collapse of asset
prices, under Taylor-type rules and optimal policy, we investigate the dynamics
of the economy when a persistent non-fundamental shock hits the economy. We
do this evaluation by means of impulse-response functions, Figure 2 to 8, and
by analysing t-steps ahead standard deviations of output following a persistent
non-fundamental shock in asset prices, reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Concerning the impulse-response functions, except for the simple in°ation-based
forecast rule, which seems to produce very unstable patterns, the results are
very similar for the whole set of simple Taylor-type rules considered in this
11analysis. Therefore, we focus our comparison on Figures 2 and 3.
A non-fundamental shock causes an increase in asset prices, which induces
a jump in gross investment and output. As long as the bubble in°ates, asset
prices, investment and output continue to grow. This overinvestment implies
a reduction of the resources available for consumption as found in (Blanchard
2000). When the bubble bursts, investment and asset prices collapse and so
does output. However, there are important di®erences in the magnitude and
volatility patterns for the optimal policy (Figure 2 and for the Taylor rule
(Figure 3).
The optimal policy motivates a more aggressive monetary policy reaction
than the Taylor rule when the economy is hit by a persistent non-fundamental
shock | see the lower-left panel. The stronger reaction of the optimal policy
guarantees that asset prices stay closer to its equilibrium value under the
optimal policy than under the Taylor rule. That behaviour of asset prices
implies that investment and output, under the optimal policy, do not deviate
as much from their equilibrium values as they do for the Taylor rule. Actually,
from the observation of the output impulse-response function (see the lower-right
panel of Figure 2) the optimal policy seems to be more e®ective in smoothing
the output path to the steady-state, resulting in a soft landing of the economy
after a crash in asset prices. The optimal policy achieves a soft landing by
stimulating consumption.
Turning now to the t-steps ahead standard deviations of output and real
interest rate, the results re°ect the uncertainty of the agents concerning the
future evolution of output and the real interest rate, given that a persistent
non-fundamental shock has hit the economy. Table 4 portrays the di®erence
between the hard landing brought about by a Taylor rule and the soft landing
under the optimal policy. While the hard landing makes output volatile in
the near future, the soft landing increases dispersion in the not so near future.
12Longer-term output forecasts will be more accurate under a Taylor rule than
under the optimal policy. The lack of aggressiveness of the Taylor rule in
the event of an asset price boom-bust episode is also evident on Table 5: the
conditional volatility of the real interest rate is always lower under the Taylor
rule, i.e., the real interest rate will be harder to forecast under the optimal
policy.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we tried to give an answer to the following question: Given the
possibility of an asset price bubble burst and a subsequent hard landing, what
is the optimal monetary policy reaction? When asset prices are driven by
non-fundamental shocks, both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule seem to
suggest that central banks should keep increasing the real interest rate, and to
decrease it sharply when the bubble bursts. However, the Taylor rule suggests
a lower increase in the real interest rate. The sharper movements in the real
interest rate induced by the optimal policy suggest that the standard Taylor
rule may be not aggressive enough in the event of an asset price boom-bust
episode.
Our results suggest that overall Taylor-type rules may be very e®ective at
stabilizing output and the real interest rate. However, they also indicate that
if central banks do care about output future's path and aim at a softlanding
| which according to (Meyer 2004), (Greenspan 2007) and (Woodford 2007)
seems to be the case | following a bubble burst they increase liquidity more
than the Taylor rule prescribes. These conclusions seem to be in accordance
with previous ¯ndings in the literature on monetary policy and asset prices
(Mishkin 2007) and suggest that further research on the relation between
deviations from the Taylor rule and volatility in ¯nancial markets may be
13justi¯ed.
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Table 1: Parameters
® ¯ ± A ¾²a ¾²µ ¾a ½1 ½2 !
0.36 0.95 0.09 1 1.2 0.6 1.5 0.687 0.679 0.5
18Table 2: Policy rules and coe±cients in the log-linearized model
Rule p11 p22 ¼t yt qt Et¼t+1 Etyt+1
optimal policy all all | | | | |
TR all all 1.5 0.5 | | |
TR+q all all 1.5 0.5 0.1 | |
IFB 0.25 0.25 | | | 1.5 |
IFB 0.25 0.50 | | | 1.5 |
IFB 0.25 0.75 | | | 1.7 |
IFB 0.50 0.25 | | | 1.9 |
IFB 0.50 0.50 | | | 1.6 |
IFB 0.50 0.75 | | | 1.8 |
IFB 0.75 all | | | 2.8 |
IFB+y all all | | | 1.5 0.5
IFB+y+q all all | | 0.1 1.5 0.5
IFB+y+q agg. all all | | 0.1 2.0 0.5
optimal policy: the optimal policy reacts to all state variables and shocks
TR: Taylor rule
IFB: In°ation forecast based rule
all: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
19Table 3: Unconditional standard deviations with p11 = p22 = 0:5
optimal TR TR+q IFB IFB+y IFB+y+q IFB+y+q agg.
c 0.8483 0.0785 0.0773 0.7578 0.0034 0.0033 0.0054
n 1.1605 2.0004 2.0097 2.3162 2.344 2.344 2.3439
k 1.2113 0.1107 0.1093 1.4319 0.0122 0.0118 0.0152
y 2.4082 0.2449 0.238 1.6335 0.0109 0.01 0.0142
r:i:r: 0.8058 0.0866 0.0836 0.2508 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
20Table 4: t-steps ahead standard deviation of output after a persistent
non-fundamental shock,
q
V (ytjs0 = 2), relative to the optimal policy, with
p11 = p22 = 0:5
t optimal TR TR+q IFB IFB+y IFB+y+q IFB+y+q agg.
1 1 12.7371 11.8506 24.1346 13.894 12.4058 12.8685
2 1 8.4769 7.9536 13.9838 10.1253 9.1209 9.4247
3 1 6.2174 5.8693 9.5364 7.7958 7.0673 7.304
4 1 4.8223 4.5727 7.3275 6.2326 5.6774 5.8748
5 1 3.8854 3.6957 6.0335 5.1253 4.685 4.8542
6 1 3.2189 3.0673 5.107 4.3071 3.9461 4.0925
7 1 2.723 2.5968 4.3845 3.6805 3.3764 3.5032
8 1 2.3404 2.2316 3.9043 3.186 2.9238 3.0336
9 1 2.036 1.9397 3.7901 2.7852 2.5551 2.6498
10 1 1.7874 1.7005 4.1034 2.4531 2.2484 2.3296
11 1 1.5801 1.5004 4.7562 2.1729 1.9888 2.0579
12 1 1.404 1.3304 5.5896 1.9328 1.7658 1.8243
13 1 1.2524 1.1839 6.4637 1.7244 1.5722 1.6212
14 1 1.1203 1.0563 7.2744 1.542 1.4026 1.4431
15 1 1.0041 0.9443 7.9442 1.3808 1.2529 1.286
16 1 0.9012 0.8453 8.4152 1.2378 1.1201 1.1468
17 1 0.8096 0.7573 8.6487 1.1101 1.0019 1.0228
18 1 0.7276 0.6788 8.6288 0.9959 0.8963 0.9123
19 1 0.6541 0.6086 8.3729 0.8934 0.8017 0.8135
20 1 0.588 0.5457 7.9487 0.8014 0.7171 0.7252
21Table 5: t-steps ahead standard deviation of the real interest rate after
a persistent non-fundamental shock,
q
V (ytjs0 = 2), relative to the optimal
policy, with p11 = p22 = 0:5
t optimal TR TR+q IFB IFB+y IFB+y+q IFB+y+q agg.
1 1 0.7954 0.818 0.0869 0.8566 0.8811 0.886
2 1 0.7425 0.7667 0.0958 0.7459 0.7809 0.7866
3 1 0.7109 0.736 0.1335 0.6826 0.7233 0.7293
4 1 0.6901 0.7156 0.1956 0.6416 0.6856 0.6916
5 1 0.6765 0.7022 0.278 0.6147 0.6604 0.6666
6 1 0.6684 0.6941 0.3758 0.5982 0.6446 0.6512
7 1 0.6647 0.6901 0.4836 0.59 0.6361 0.6433
8 1 0.6642 0.6895 0.5942 0.5884 0.6336 0.6418
9 1 0.6663 0.6913 0.6997 0.5918 0.6358 0.6453
10 1 0.6701 0.6949 0.7913 0.599 0.6417 0.6528
11 1 0.675 0.6997 0.8618 0.609 0.6504 0.6635
12 1 0.6805 0.7052 0.9094 0.6208 0.661 0.6765
13 1 0.686 0.7108 0.9462 0.6336 0.6727 0.691
14 1 0.6909 0.716 1.0118 0.6466 0.685 0.7062
15 1 0.6949 0.7203 1.1784 0.659 0.6969 0.7215
16 1 0.6972 0.7232 1.5186 0.6702 0.7078 0.736
17 1 0.6975 0.724 2.0631 0.6794 0.717 0.7489
18 1 0.695 0.7221 2.8038 0.6859 0.7237 0.7593
19 1 0.6892 0.7171 3.7142 0.6889 0.7271 0.7665
20 1 0.6797 0.7082 4.754 0.6877 0.7265 0.7697
22Figure 1: Federal funds rate target and the target computed using Taylor's
rule











23Figure 2: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the optimal
policy

































24Figure 3: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the TR
































25Figure 4: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the TR+q































26Figure 5: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the IFB


































27Figure 6: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the IFB+y







































28Figure 7: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the IFB+y+q




































29Figure 8: Impulse-response functions when there is a persistent
non-fundamental shock in period 1 and the policymaker employs the aggressive
IFB+y+q
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